

Introduction

The history of psychoanalysis has been punctuated by theoretical dissonance but perhaps no debate has been as wide ranging and has had such profound implications as that involving object relations theory. It is the purpose of this book to bring together those papers which have been seminal to the development of this theory. Many different authors are represented and, as will quickly become apparent from reading them, they often hold radically different viewpoints concerning the importance, meaning, and functions of “objects” and, by extension, the environment in the psychological development and mental life of individuals. Questions of the relationships between what is “internal” and what is “external” abound in writings on this subject. How do our significant early relationships with others become internalized and affect our subsequent view of the world and other people? What aspects of our early relationships determine those whom we choose as lover, spouse, or friend? What is the dynamic nature of our internal object world, how does it evolve and what are the implications for therapy? What is biologically innate in the psychology of the individual and what is modulated by direct environmental experience? What is the nature of motivation—the pressure of instinctual wishes or the seeking of relationships with others? Questions of this magnitude which are central to an understanding of human psychology do not easily lend themselves to a unitary theory, and it may be more accurate to speak of a continuum of object relations theories.

Two opposing poles of this continuum can be discerned. The first lies within the classical psychoanalytic realm and sees objects as the person or things on to which the biological drives are concentrated. A crucial element of this view of the object is that the mental representation of the thing or person is cathected with aggressive or libidinal energy and not the external thing or person. Arlow (1980) summarized this conceptualization: “Fundamentally, it is the effect of unconscious fantasy wishes, connected with specific mental representations of objects that colors, distorts and affects the ultimate quality of interpersonal relations. It is important to distinguish between the person and the object.

This is essentially the core of transference, in which the person in the real world is confused with a mental representation of the childhood object, a mental representation of what was either a person or a thing.” Arlow thus emphasized the concept of the object as an intrapsychic mental representation whose evolution cannot be separated from the vicissitudes of the drives. He stated “in later experience these (drives) become organized in terms of persistent unconscious fantasies that ultimately affect object choice and patterns of loving.” He further comments that it is not simply “the experience with the object, but what is done with the experience, that is decisive for development.”

The work of W. R. Fairbairn is the opposite of Arlow’s. Concepts of drives as being central to human motivation are abandoned. In their place object relations are seen as being the determining factors in development. The role of the object as merely the goal of the drive to enable its discharge is replaced by the predominance of the object. Fairbairn (1952) states: “Psychology is a study of the relationships of the individual to his objects, whilst, in similar terms, psychopathology may be said to resolve itself more specifically into a study of the relationship of the ego to its internalized objects.” Here the experience of the object in reality becomes of crucial importance and determines psychic structure and the internal objects are viewed as reflections of experiences with real persons. Object seeking is dominant, while the pleasure principle is not. Guntrip (1961, p. 288) a follower of Fairbairn writes: “Freud’s impersonal ‘pleasure-principle’ treated the object as a mere means to the end of a purely subjective and impersonal tension-relieving ‘process’ and not as sought for its intrinsic value in a relationship. . . . From this point of view Fairbairn subordinates the pleasure-principle to the reality-principle, which is now seen to be the object-relationships principle: whereas Freud regards the reality-principle simply as a delayed pleasure-principle.”

Between the theories of Arlow and Fairbairn lie a range of views concerning the function of objects. Direct observation of young children and their mothers by Margaret Mahler and her colleagues has resulted in a body of “objective” behavioral data upon which a developmental model of the infant’s psychological separation from the mother has been built, a model which has major implications for object relations theory and for therapy since some clinicians now emphasize preoedipal mother-child dyadic issues in their work with patients and trace trans-

ferences back to early mother-child interactions. Inherent in Mahler's work is a theory of the psychological development of the "self", the obverse side of object relations since the intrapsychic world of the individual contains both self and object representations. The development of the self is at the center of Kohut's work which is the subject of considerable controversy among contemporary psychoanalysts.

At first sight the descriptive term "object" seems infelicitous with its apparently dehumanizing connotation, but Freud's original use of the word was technically specific and free from mechanistic implications. He stated in the first of his "Three Essays on Theory of Sexuality" (1905): "I shall at this point introduce two technical terms. Let us call the person from whom sexual attraction proceeds the sexual object and the act towards which the instinct tends the sexual aim. Scientifically sifted observation, then, shows that numerous deviations occur in respect of both of these—the sexual object and the sexual aim." Hence in this essay the sexual object is tied directly to the instinct, the sexual drive, and is subservient to it. In the third of these essays, Freud stated: "This ego-libido is, however, only conveniently accessible to analytic study when it has been put to the use of cathecting sexual objects, that is, when it has become object-libido. We can then perceive it concentrating upon objects, becoming fixed upon them or abandoning them, moving from one object to another and, from these situations, directing the subjects sexual activity, which leads to the satisfaction, that is to the partial and temporary extinction of the libido." It should be noted that Freud is here referring to mental representations of objects, and not objects in the external world.

In his paper "On Narcissism" Freud (1914) postulated that there is an original libidinal cathexis of the ego (the term "ego" here refers to the self and does not have the specialized meaning that it acquires in the later (1923) structural theory of id, ego, and superego). Some of this cathexis is later in development given off to objects, but this object libido remains connected to ego libido "much as the body of an amoeba is related to the pseudopodia which it puts out." Freud asked the question as to what makes it necessary for one to pass beyond the limits of narcissism (ego libido) and to attach libido to objects. His answer is found in the economic model: "When the cathexis of the ego with libido exceeds a certain amount . . . our mental apparatus as being first and foremost a device designed for mastering excitations which would oth-

erwise be felt as distressing or would have pathogenic effects.” In his 1915 paper ‘Instincts and their Vicissitudes’ Freud stated: “When the purely narcissistic stage has given place to the object-stage, pleasure and unpleasure signify relations of the ego to the object. If the object becomes a source of pleasurable feelings, a motor urge is set up which seeks to bring the object closer to the ego and to incorporate it into the ego.” Here the concept of internalization of objects is introduced.

In “Mourning and Melancholia” (1917) Freud postulated a mechanism of internalization: “The ego wants to incorporate the object into itself and, in accordance with the oral or cannibalistic phase of libidinal development . . . it wants to do so by devouring it.” In “Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego” (1921) Freud viewed identification as the earliest expression of an emotional tie with another person and sees it as ambivalent from the beginning: “It behaves like a derivative of the first oral phase of the organization of the libido, in which the object that we long for and prize is assimilated by eating and is in that way annihilated as such. The cannibal, as we know, has remained at this standpoint; he has a devouring affection for his enemies and only devours people of whom he is fond.” If an object is lost to the individual, identification occurs with the lost object as a substitute for it and it is introjected into the ego.

In 1923, in one of his last theoretical papers, “The Ego and the Id,” Freud posits his structural theory of psychic organization, a new conception that was to profoundly influence later psychoanalytic thinking. In this paper he stated that “the character of the ego is a precipitate of abandoned object-cathexis and that it contains the history of these object-choices.” The demolition of the oedipus complex with its giving up of the boy’s object-cathexis of the mother leads to either an identification with his mother or an intensification of his identification with his father: “A portion of the external world has, at least partially, been abandoned as an object and has instead by identification been taken into the ego and thus become an integral part of the internal world. This new psychical agency continues to carry on the functions which have hitherto been performed by the people (the abandoned objects) in the external world.” Thus occurs the formation of the superego.

It can be seen that Freud has a developed object relations theory within his work, but one that is firmly based on the primacy of the

drives and of the object's being an intrapsychic mental representation cathected with sexual and aggressive energy.

In one of his last papers Freud (1940) made an eloquent and moving statement concerning the child's relationship to his first object: "A child's first erotic object is the mother's breast that nourishes it; love has its origin in attachment to the satisfied need for nourishment. There is no doubt that, to begin with, the child does not distinguish between the breast and its own body; when the breast has to be separated from the body and shifted to the 'outside' because the child so often finds it absent, it carries with it as an 'object' part of the original narcissistic libidinal cathexis. This first object is later completed into the person of the child's mother, who not only nourishes it, but also looks after it and thus arouses in it a number of other physical sensations, pleasurable and unpleasurable. By her care of the child's body she becomes its first seducer. In these two relations lies the root of a mother's importance, unique, without parallel, established unalterably for a whole lifetime as the first and strongest love-object and as the prototype of all later love-relations—for both sexes."

The next major development in object relations theory after Freud is to be found in the work of Melanie Klein, the progenitor of the so-called "British" school of object relations. Through her clinical experience with children and patients suffering from severe psychiatric illness in the 1930s and 1940s she developed an influential "internal objects" theory. Her conception of development and psychopathology provided a springboard for Fairbairn and Winnicott's elaborations, and some of her concepts have been incorporated into the work of contemporary theorists such as Kernberg.

Klein (1935) posits a developmental theory in which the psychological growth of the infant is governed by mechanisms of introjection and projection: "From the beginning the ego introjects objects 'good' and 'bad,' for both of which its mother's breast is the prototype—for good objects when the child obtains it and for bad when it fails him. But it is because the baby projects its own aggression on to these objects that it feels them to be 'bad' and not only in that they frustrate its desires: the child conceives of them as actually dangerous—persecutors who it fears will devour it, scoop out the inside of its body, cut it to pieces, poison it—in short compassing its destruction by all the means which sadism

can devise. These images, which are a phantastically distorted picture of the real objects upon which they are based, are installed by it not only in the outside world but, by the process of incorporation, also within the ego. Hence quite little children pass through anxiety-situations (and react to them with defense-mechanisms), the content of which is comparable to that of the psychoses of adults.' It can be seen from this quotation that central to Klein's object relation theory is a view of the drives as motivational, but unlike Freud who developed a bipartite theory of the drives as embodying both libido and aggression, Klein gives predominance to the aggressive drive.

In Klein's theory the role of unconscious phantasy in the mental life of the individual is also considerably extended. She sees unconscious phantasy as operating from the beginning of life, accompanying and expressing the drives. Since there are no "objective" means of determining whether or not the newborn infant is indeed experiencing organized phantasies (which imply the presence of a high degree of ego structure early in life) this aspect of her theory has received much less than universal acceptance.

Hanna Segal, (1964) in her monograph summarizing Klein's theories, states: "For example, an infant going to sleep, contentedly making sucking noises and movements with his mouth or sucking his own fingers, phantasies that he is actually sucking or incorporating the breast and goes to sleep with a phantasy of having the milk-giving breast actually inside himself. Similarly, a hungry, raging infant, screaming and kicking, phantasies that he is actually attacking the breast, tearing and destroying it, and experiences his own screams which tear him and hurt him as the torn breast attacking him in his own inside. Therefore, not only does he experience a want, but his hunger pain and his own screams may be felt as a persecutory attack on his inside. Phantasy forming is a function of the ego. The view of phantasy as a mental expression of instincts through the medium of the ego assumes a higher degree of ego organization than is usually postulated by Freud. It assumes that the ego from birth is capable of forming, and indeed is driven by instincts and anxiety to form primitive object relationships in phantasy and reality. From the moment of birth the infant has to deal with the impact of reality, starting with the experience of birth itself and proceeding to endless experiences of gratification and frustration of his desires. The reality experiences immediately influence and are influ-

enced by unconscious phantasy. Phantasy is not merely an escape from reality, but a constant and unavoidable accompaniment of real experiences, constantly interacting with them.” Segal thus notes that while unconscious phantasizing is constantly affecting the perception of reality, reality does influence unconscious phantasizing. Nonetheless, there is a somewhat hermetic aspect to Klein’s view of the internal mental world. (For example, Segal states: “The importance of the environmental factor can only be correctly evaluated in relation to what it means in terms of the infant’s own instincts and phantasies. . . . It is when the infant has been under the sway of angry phantasies, attacking the breast, that an actual bad experience becomes all the more important, since it confirms, not only his feeling that the internal world is bad, but also the sense of his own badness and the omnipotence of his malevolent phantasies”). In some senses Klein’s is the ultimate depth psychology wherein the internal mental world has an inexorable development, and experiences of object relations in real life, and hence the environment, are of secondary importance.

Of major importance in Klein’s theory is the mechanism of splitting, whereby the primary object, the breast, is split into the ideal breast and the persecutory breast, both of which are introjected in the internal object world. With later development the inner world of the individual is organized around complementary fantasies of internal good and bad objects. The sense of self as good or bad is related to the relative predominance of good or bad objects in the internal object world. The concept of splitting an external object into internal good and bad objects during development and later failures in integration of these two opposites in some individuals thereby preventing them experiencing both goodness and badness in the same object and thus alternating between absolute extremes of perceiving others and the self as “all good” or “all bad” is central to Kernberg’s hypothesis of the aetiology of borderline personality disorders.

Aside from the dubious proposition that the very young infant possesses elaborate mental capacities, Klein’s theory of the internal object world has been criticized for its anthropomorphism and its Hieronymous Bosch-like quality of persecutory and loving internal objects, but as Guntrip (1969, p. 407) observes, she developed a new conception of endopsychic structure: “Before Klein the human psyche was regarded as an apparatus for experiencing and controlling biological instincts

originating outside the ego. . . . After Klein it became possible to see the human psyche as an internal world of a fully personal nature, a world of internalized ego-object relationships, which partly realistically and partly in highly distorted ways, reproduced the ego's relationships to personal objects in the real outer world." Even though her theory is thoroughly tied to a belief in the importance of the drives she sets the stage for Fairbairn's replacement of instinct theory by a primary object relations theory.

Fairbairn, taking as his starting point Melanie Klein's conception of internalized objects, rejected Freud's instinct theory and put in its place object relationships: "The object, and not gratification, is the ultimate aim of libidinal striving." For Fairbairn (1954) "the pristine personality of the child consists of a unitary dynamic ego" and "the first defense adopted by the original ego to deal with an unsatisfying personal relationship is mental internalization, or introjection of the unsatisfying object." Hence the child begins with a structured ego complete with defenses which are object-related. The nature of this process of internalization, however, remains murky in Fairbairn's writing (as it does in psychoanalytic theory in general).

It was through his studies of the psychopathology of schizoid states that Fairbairn abandoned instinct theory. The schizoid individual in his view is frustrated by the acute anxiety engendered by the need to love. For the schizoid person it is love which seems to destroy, leading such individuals to withdraw from objects in the outside world for fear of destroying them. Guntrip (1961, p. 287) summarizes this in the following manner: "Love-object relationships are the whole of the problem, and the conflicts over them are an intense and devastating drama of need, fear, anger and hopelessness. To attempt to account for this by a hedonistic theory of motivation, namely that the person is seeking the satisfactions of oral, anal and genital pleasure, is so impersonal and inadequate that it takes on the aspect of being itself a product of schizoid thinking. One of my patients dreamed that she was physically grafted on to a man who represented to her a good father figure (on to whom was displaced an original umbilical relation to the mother). She would say that whenever anyone important to her went away, she felt the bottom had dropped out of her own self, and her emotional history was a long series of infatuations with older men who stood to her in loco parentis. She had grown up quite specially love-starved in an affec-

tionless home. To try to reduce such problems to a quest for the pleasure of physical and emotional relaxing of sexual needs is a travesty of the personal realities of human life. As Fairbairn's patient protested: 'What I want is a father.' So Fairbairn concluded that 'the ultimate goal of libido is the object'".

As Guntrip also notes, Fairbairn, in contradistinction to Klein, places great emphasis on the external facts of the child's real-life object relations as the cause of psychopathology. In this conception, the crucial individuals in the child's immediate early environment are at the root of psychopathology a view that is paralleled in the later work of Kohut.

Fairbairn's developmental theory begins with a stage of infantile dependence wherein the mouth is the libidinal organ and the maternal breast the libidinal object. Infantile dependence proceeds via a transitional stage to mature dependence wherein ego and object are fully differentiated and the individual is capable of valuing the object for its own sake. Fairbairn (1952, p. 341) states: "This process of development is characterized (a) by the gradual abandonment of an original object relationship based upon primary identification, and (b) by the gradual adoption of an object relationship based upon differentiation of the object. The gradual change which thus occurs in the nature of the object relationship is accompanied by a gradual change in libidinal aim, whereby an original oral, sucking, incorporating and predominantly 'taking' aim comes to be replaced by a mature, non-incorporating and predominantly 'giving' aim compatible with developed genital sexuality." In this view schizophrenia and depression are, in part at least, a consequence of disturbances of development during the stage of infantile dependence. Obsessional, paranoid, hysterical and phobic symptoms arise from attempts by the ego to deal with difficulties arising over object relationships during the transitional stage based on "endopsychic situations which have resulted from the internalization of objects with which the ego has had relationships during the stage of infantile dependence."

For Fairbairn (1952, p. 110) there is no reason to internalize a satisfying object: "In my opinion, it is always the 'bad' object (i.e., at this stage, the unsatisfying object) that is internalized in the first instance; for I find it difficult to attach any meaning to the primary internalization of a 'good' object which is both satisfying and amenable from the infant's point of view. There are those, of course, who would argue that

it would be natural for the infant, when in a state of deprivation, to internalize the good object on the wish-fulfillment principle; but, as it seems to me, internalization of objects is essentially a measure of coercion and it is not the satisfying object, but the unsatisfying object that the infant seeks to coerce. I speak of 'the satisfying object' and 'unsatisfying object', because I consider that, in this connection, the terms 'good object' and 'bad object,' tend to be misleading. They tend to be misleading because they are liable to be understood in the sense of 'desired object' and 'undesired object' respectively. There can be no doubt, however, that a bad (viz. unsatisfying) object may be desired. Indeed it is just because the infant's bad object is desired as well as felt to be bad that it is internalized."

Fairbairn conceptualizes this unsatisfying object as having two aspects, one that frustrates and one that tempts. In order for the infant to deal with a now internalized intolerable situation, he splits the internal bad object into two—an exciting object and a frustrating object and represses both. As repression of objects proceeds, the ego becomes divided, the original unitary ego is split and it is the relationship of the ego to these introjected objects that is the cause of intrapsychic conflict and hence psychopathology.

For Fairbairn, the presence of ego at the beginning of life replaces the classical view of undifferentiated id out of which structure will develop and this ego is object-directed. Ernest Jones (1952) summarizes Fairbairn's position: "If it were possible to condense Dr. Fairbairn's new ideas into one sentence, it might run somewhat as follows. Instead of starting, as Freud did, from stimulation of the nervous system proceeding from excitation of various erotogenous zones and internal tension arising from gonadic activity, Dr. Fairbairn starts at the center of the personality, the ego, and depicts its strivings and difficulties in its endeavour to reach an object where it may find support."

Impulses for Fairbairn represent merely the dynamic aspect of ego-structures and a radical reformulating of Freud's tripartite structural view of the mind is undertaken. The concept of psychosexual stages is reformulated: "[Abraham] made the general mistake of conferring the status of libidinal phases upon what are really techniques employed by the individual in his object-relationships" (1952, p. 143).

Fairbairn's work is a radical departure from classical theory. In its emphasis on the importance of early object relationships and the pro-

found impact of the child's environment upon psychological development and psychopathology it possesses close parallels with the later theoretical formulations of Kohut.

Heinz Kohut's clinical work with narcissistic disturbances (1971) led him to postulate a separate narcissistic line of development occurring alongside psychosexual and ego development. As his theory evolved he developed a complete self psychology (1977) and abandoned concepts of instinctual drives as primary. His conceptualization of the development of the self has to be seen as an object relations theory and within it there are strong echoes of the work of Fairbairn particularly in its environmentalist approach, namely, that early actual object relations are central to the development of the personality and the self. Kohut's theory of therapy also possesses close analogies to the concepts of Winnicott and Fairbairn by providing in the treatment situation a "good object" for the patient in the person of the therapist who will be internalized and thus mitigate or repair deficits in the structure of the self resulting from inadequate early parenting.

Edith Jacobson (1954) attempted to extend the instinctual model of the mind to encompass a fuller understanding of the development of both self and object relations. Working within the classical psychoanalytic tradition, she views the original "primary narcissistic state" of the newborn baby as a condition of diffuse dispersion of instinctual forces within a wholly undifferentiated psychic organization. In her conception, the libidinal and aggressive drives develop out of this state of undifferentiated physiological energy. Jacobson sees the discharge of psychic energy to the inside or the outside as crucial to an understanding of early infantile narcissism. She postulates that, from birth on, the infant possesses channels of discharge of psychic energy to the outside, (e.g., the mother's breast) which are the precursors of later object-related discharge. She views the building up of stable self and object representations cathected with libidinal energy as a central developmental task. Like its primitive object images, the child's concept of self is initially unstable: "Emerging from sensations hardly distinguishable from perceptions of the gratifying part-object, it is first fused and confused with the object images and is composed of a constantly changing series of self-images which reflect the incessant fluctuations of the primitive mental state."

In an illuminating statement on the relationship of unconscious fan-

tasy to self and object relationships she observes that unpleasurable memories are dealt with by infantile repression which thus eliminates large parts of the unacceptable aspects of the self and the outside world. The lacunae that are left are filled in by distortions or elaborations of the ego's defense system. Repressed fantasies will then lend current self and object representations "the coloring of past infantile images." An example that Jacobson provides of the dramatic phenomenon of infantile emotional experience preventing the formation of a correct body image is the persistence in women of the ubiquitous unconscious fantasy that their genital is castrated accompanied by a simultaneous denial and development of illusory penis fantasies.

Energic concepts remain central to Jacobson's thinking for she views libido as moving from love objects to the self and from the self to love objects during early developmental stages. Healthy ego functioning in her view requires adequate, evenly distributed, constant, libidinous cathexis of both object and self-representations. Differing drastically from Melanie Klein, Jacobson places the building up of self and object-representations firmly within the classical schemata of psychosexual development rather than telescoping them backwards to early infancy. Thus, at first, the infant can barely discriminate between pleasurable sensations and the objects which provide them. Only with the increasing maturation of perception can gratifications or frustrations become associated with the object. The unpleasurable experiences of deprivation and separation from the love object give rise to fantasies of incorporation of the gratifying object, expressing a wish to reestablish union with the gratifying mother, a desire that Jacobson notes never ceases to play a part in one's emotional life. She states: "Thus the earliest wishful fantasies of merging and being one with the mother (breast) are the foundations on which all future types of identifications are built. . . . The hungry infant's longing for oral gratification is the origin of the first primitive type of identification, an identification achieved by refusion of self and object images and founded on wishful fantasies of oral incorporation of the love object."

A gradual transition from fantasies of total incorporation to partial incorporation occurs with development marking the change from a desire for complete union to a wish to become like the mother. Jacobson views the internal object world as undergoing constant fluctuations

during this period with libido and aggression moving from the love object to the self and back again while self and object images as well as images of different objects undergo temporary fusions and separations. The mental life of the preoedipal child is dominated by magical fantasies, aspects of which persist into later life. Jacobson makes the point that it is necessary to clearly distinguish between external objects and their endopsychic representations and she criticizes Melanie Klein for failing to distinguish these mental representations from those of the self.

As growth proceeds instinctual strivings stimulate the development of identifications in general. As the little boy discovers sexual difference, his father becomes the main object of identification. As the ego evolves there is a building up of ego identifications and object relations, of self and object representations. With the resolution of the oedipus complex and consequent superego formation, Jacobson sees the mental representations of the self and object world as taking on a lasting form. These in turn profoundly affect aspects of the personality and the manner in which the individual views himself vis-à-vis the world. Jacobson states: "With full maturation and the achievement of instinctual mastery the representations of the self and of the object world in general acquire a final, characteristic configuration. When we compare and confront these formations with each other we find that in a normal person they have what may be called 'complementary' qualities which display a prominent aspect of his personality. When we characterize somebody, for instance, as an 'optimist', we mean that he regards himself as a lucky person, that he expects to be always successful and to gain gratifications easily, and that he views the world in a complementary way: as bound to be good and pleasurable and to treat him well. In harmony with these concepts he will be a person inclined to be hopeful, gay, and in good spirits. By contrast, the 'pessimist' will experience the world as a constant source of harm, disappointment and failure, and himself accordingly as a poor devil forever apt to be deprived and hurt; consequently, the level of his mood will be preponderantly low. These examples show that, in a mature individual, these complementary qualities of his object-and self-representations reflect and define his *Weltbild*, his fundamental position in relation to the world. The fact that in the course of life our *Weltbild* may undergo further radical changes indicates that even after maturation and stabilization our con-

cepts of the object world and of our own self may be profoundly influenced and altered by our life experiences and the biological stages through which we pass.”

Kernberg (1979) notes that Jacobson’s developmental model is the only comprehensive object relations theory that links the child’s development of object relations, defense mechanisms, and instinctual vicissitudes with Freud’s psychic apparatus of ego, id and superego. Hence, it represents the furthest extension to date of classical psychoanalysis into the field of object relations theory.

It can be seen from this brief review that the field of object relations theory is far from static and there is much theoretical ferment and disparate opinion. At their extremes the opposing poles of object-relations theory are a resurfacing of the ancient nature versus nurture debate. Melanie Klein’s theory of inborn instinctual nature as determinative of development lies at one end. Fairbairn and Winnicott, who conceived of early actual object relationships as the primary source of motivation represent the environmentalist viewpoint at the other end of the spectrum. The implications of these different viewpoints for the theory and practice of psychoanalysis are considerable. Further developments within this fertile field are to be anticipated and welcomed. Whether or not, however, the classical view of drive-determined development will be reconciled with the more environmentalist position remains, for the present, an unanswered question.

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